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Допоки ми тут мандавошок в матні у наших політблазнів рахуємо (/)
#1
Exclamation 
Дехто діло робить.
Такий собі прожект на тему, шо дєлать опісля занепаду расєюшкі. Колись вже зауважував, що й нам цей напрямок слід пропрацьовувать, щоб не прибило "щепками", що полетать і щоб зуміть натирить з цього плюшок.
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Russia in Decline

This project is an attempt to envision what the pathways animating Russia’s decline could look like; identify the forces, attitudes, and ideas driving them; and describe the possible contingencies that could emerge along the pathways to a range of possible alternative destinations. It seeks to reveal how potential downside scenarios might unfold, the dynamics that could power them, the critical uncertainties whose resolution might push scenarios in different directions, and the possible wildcards that might radically, rapidly, and unpredictably alter the shape and movement of the competitive landscape, as well as the motivations and strategies of different actors.

The project’s analyses and products will appear on this Jamestown Foundation website. The papers by Russian experts are the first such postings. We further envision compiling these materials in a single volume, as well as several smaller, focused analyses on particular aspects of Russia’s decline, with appropriate contextual analysis and synthetic assessment. The final volume will be published by The Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/russia-in-decline/
РАШИЗМ - НІПРАЙДЬОТЬ! Wink
Відповісти
#2
(14-07-2016, 22:40 )Slavix писав(ла): Дехто діло робить.
Такий собі прожект на тему, шо дєлать опісля занепаду расєюшкі. Колись вже зауважував, що й нам цей напрямок слід пропрацьовувать, щоб не прибило "щепками", що полетать і щоб зуміть натирить з цього плюшок.

рашка, в теперішньому вигляді, є шісткою єврокагалу. А єврокагал - це зборище старих підарасів і мудаків, які всі народи бачать лише в сенсі власної наживи, жаги до влади і примітивних звіриних ідей, підточених старчим маразмом. Скоро їм пиздець, тож не варто відволікатися.

Рашку ж кілька століть терпеливо виводили і дресирували, як засіб, яким зручно ворогів давити, та поступ свободи підгальмовувати. Свободу всяка бидлота злодійська не любить, бо воно світло, а бидлота - темний хробак.

Отож, перед тим, як про розподіл рашки думати - розберіться спершу з хробаком у власній хаті. Який натхненно точить ваші і наші ресурси. Скоро лісу вже не залишиться, блядь, а дурним матолкам рашка в голові. Неадеквати йобнуті.
Відповісти
#3
По-перше цього не буде.
По-друге нічого хорошого для України такий варіант не несе.

Треба виходити з того, що Росія завжди буде нашим сусідом.

А чи завжди буде ворогом?
Другом не буде (і не треба нам її дружби).

А активна підривна робота проти України буде поки ми не станемо українцями, поки в Кремлі буде надія затягнути нас в русскій мір.

Тож нам не на Росію треба дивитись, а творити українську націю і будувати українську державу.
Відповісти
#4
(15-07-2016, 18:49 )Анатoль писав(ла): По-перше цього не буде.
По-друге нічого хорошого для України такий варіант не несе.
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Буде чи ні покаже час. Уже писав, і повторюсь: це не мріяння і не звалювання нам на голови торбини з щастям. Коли це станеться, на голову нам звалиться чимало клопотів, то ж краще буть готовими заздалегідь, ніж так як до війни, торочачи, що не буде, доки півник смажений не дзьобне.
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Тож нам не на Росію треба дивитись, а творити українську націю і будувати українську державу.
Треба, як я і зазначав, пильнувати власний інтерес, як в частині ризиків, так і в частині вигод. І з тим, що треба будувати УКРАІНСЬКУ державу, а не чергову расєюшку без путюна я не лише погоджуюся, але й наполягаю. При цьому, демонтаж расєюшкі нестиме ризики посилення позицій саме варіанту побудови тут альтернативноі расєі.
РАШИЗМ - НІПРАЙДЬОТЬ! Wink
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#5
(15-07-2016, 19:19 )Slavix писав(ла): Треба, як я і зазначав, пильнувати власний інтерес,
демонтаж расєюшкі нестиме ризики посилення позицій саме варіанту побудови тут альтернативноі расєі.

Так, іміграція з Росії сприятиме русифікації України.
Всі ці шустери, кисельови, ганапольські і зараз русифікують інформ.простір України.
Це взагалі неподобство, що іноземцям дозволяють працювати в українському телеефірі ведучими без знаня української, вести передачі іноземною мовою.
(Хоча це не лише іноземців стосується).
Відповісти
#6
(15-07-2016, 19:32 )Анатoль писав(ла):
(15-07-2016, 19:19 )Slavix писав(ла): Треба, як я і зазначав, пильнувати власний інтерес,
демонтаж расєюшкі нестиме ризики посилення позицій саме варіанту побудови тут альтернативноі расєі.

Так, іміграція з Росії сприятиме русифікації України.
Всі ці шустери, кисельови, ганапольські і зараз русифікують інформ.простір України.
Це взагалі неподобство, що іноземцям дозволяють працювати в українському телеефірі ведучими без знаня української, вести передачі іноземною мовою.
(Хоча це не лише іноземців стосується).
І еміграція, і бізнес і гуманітарка і відкриті кордони і ще багато чого. В даному випадку, я хочу звернути увагу, що якщо ми не будемо займатися питанням, що має робити Украіна при демонтажу расєюшкі, то ним будуть займатися 'правильні' кацапи в постановці 'а чьой нам дзєлаць с Украінай-та кагда у нас начьньоцца'
РАШИЗМ - НІПРАЙДЬОТЬ! Wink
Відповісти
#7
Nikolay Petrov -- What Does Russia’s Decline Look Like?

Publication: Russia In Decline Volume: 1 Issue: 1July 6, 2016 05:16 PM Age: 8 days
By: Nikolay Petrov

Prior to 2014, there were expectations that Russia’s probable decline would happen as an Argentina-type scenario of steady sagging/decay. This looked rational in economic terms, but authorities—faced with political crises and basically unable to fix the problem of legitimacy following their electoral win in 2012—decided to switch to a different model of legitimacy: that of military-emergency, instead of electoral.

In 2014, Putin forced the issue greatly, raising the stakes and making the scenario of a steady decline practically impossible. The option of maintaining the status quo indefinitely without serious negative consequences has disappeared. The cost of a 20-percentage-point increase in Putin’s popularity due to “KrymNash” (“Crimea is ours”—a slogan that became popular in Russia in connection with the Crimean annexation) was not only an economic slump but also an inflated public expectation of “the restoration of Russia’s greatness.” In other words, Putin has taken credit for his newly elevated popularity, and the interest rate is very high.

Causes and Conditions of Decline

Russia’s decay derives not just from a single process but from a combination of a number of descending waves of different lengths. The longest of them, which began during the Soviet Union, is connected with an accumulation of technological underdevelopment caused by negative stimuli such as repressions, while alternative positive stimuli did not exist. The second downward wave appeared at the end of Putin’s first presidential term, when authorities provoked uncertainty by changing their position with regard to property rights. The country was sucked into a vortex with a decreasing time horizon, with long-term investment—both financial and political—becoming irrational, and short-term goals taking priority. Finally, the third and shortest wave began in 2014, when Russia revised the rules of the game of international order, sparking a sharp confrontation with the West.

Moreover, Russia’s decay is, by itself, of a multidimensional, nonlinear character. Its objective unevenness in time is worsened by the subjective perceptions of both elites and citizens. Decline is, therefore, uneven in different directions, whether in economic, social, military-political, or ideological terms; and sometimes, it is not even unidirectional, which creates internal tensions. This is also the reason for growing inadequacy in decision-makers’ brains. Putin’s “maternal capital” program illustrates this point well, and also demonstrates the urge to find simplistic solutions for complicated problems. The program, designed to arrest Russia’s decline in population growth, provided women with monetary incentives to encourage the birth of a second child. While an increase in the birthdate did occur, this coincided with a period during which the children of baby boomers were already having children. And, since that brief surge, birth rates have once again declined. Nevertheless, Putin continues to cite the program as proof that demographers were wrong and that he fixed the problem.

During his 16 years in power, Putin, as well as elites and citizens, became accustomed to growth and to flourishing on the basis of an ever-growing budget. The luxurious car that until recently was comfortably rushing downhill has all of a sudden found itself on a rocky, dirt road without any asphalt onto which the car can be pushed or even partly unloaded. What does the load signify? Two-thirds of the budget is allocated to: 1) siloviki (law enforcement and security agencies); 2) the military-industrial complex; 3) social obligations; and 4) the pension system. It needs to be cut drastically. In the case of points 2 through 4, the on-going election prevents full spending levels; in the case of siloviki, spending began with the reform of the National Guard. Budget reductions have not yet been too severe, but will be immediately following the elections, when authorities begin to make cuts in the social sphere, pensions, and military industry.

The most dangerous moment in terms of elites’ and citizens’ dissatisfaction is not when the smooth road ends, but rather when they realize that it will be at an end for a long time into the future. A state of quasi-martial law, in fact introduced by Putin, is considered to be temporary and not long-lasting, but this perception will change.

Possible Scenarios for the Future

Two basic options can be considered: (1) a crisis, although not a collapse, leading to authorities’ attempts to react in ways similar to what they are doing now; that is, reacting to the decline of United Russia’s popularity and the dismantling of regional political machinery; (2) collapse resulting from a crisis chain reaction/avalanche. The first option is by all means preferable, and there are some separate positive examples, such as United Russia’s recent primaries leading to more public politics and more competition. Nevertheless, this scenario is plagued by three major problems: first, a shortage of time does not give hope to the idea that Putin will manage to adjust the system given the increasingly complex external challenges that must be addressed prior to the coming of a potential collapse; second, an increasing shortage of resources puts limits on the system’s capacity to react as adequately as it had in previous crises; and third, the system itself does not enable forecasting or preparation for potential crises over a longer term, thus encouraging authorities to react only to immediate problems, rather than avoid future ones.

Partial collapse is an unlikely scenario as well. In the 1990s, the federal superstructure collapsed, but the regional structure kept the system from complete decay. It looks now as though the latter will be incapable of remaining intact, and decline will go further. This could happen in two basic ways: first, with local crises developing into national ones owing to the inability of degraded local authorities either to fix or prevent crises from spreading. Yevgeny Gontmacher described this phenomenon in his “Novocherkassk 2009” piece. Second, authorities could provoke a growing crisis due to bad management and inadequate actions. One should add that if authorities prove somehow capable of dealing with separate crises, overlapping crises can have synergistic effects, making the possibility of timely and effective reaction much more complicated.

Disintegration

Not only can disintegration not be excluded at some point, but it looks almost inevitable both in soft and hard forms. In fact, it is already happening. Growing regional autonomy is an inevitable result of the financial weakening of the center. The model of “buying” the loyalty of regional elites, especially of ethnic ones and particularly those from the Caucasus, is breaking down and may soon lead to serious consequences. One need only observe Kadyrov’s changing behavior to understand what can follow. In other cases, a tug of war by the regions may continue without sharp public démarches.

Times of crisis resulting from both centrifugal and center-rejecting moves will likely intensify. The return of public politics with elections and the understandable desire by elites—from both the center and the regions—to direct blame and responsibility for increasing socio-economic problems on those in power should serve as catalysts.

The disintegration of the USSR provides a useful model, with “the parade of sovereignties” increasing at first, followed by decay of the whole Soviet space resulting from a certain shock. Alternatively, in the absence of a big bang, regions that are less connected to the whole will secede one by one. Chechnya and the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus are clearly first in line.

A loosening of the unified tissue of the country may occur not only along regional, but corporate lines as well.

Degradation of Regional Elites

The quality of regional elites has degraded significantly compared with that in the 1990s, and only continues. Major reasons for this trend include extreme weakness of popular political engagement in the absence of normal competitive elections; corrosive choices made by the central power, which favor loyalty rather than efficiency; incitement by federal generals based in the regions against local elites; and troubleshooting by strong, authoritative persons capable of consolidating regional elites in the service of their own interests. One should add to this the outflow of talented individuals from the regions, who are both forced (pushed) and voluntarily (pulled) away, because of the centralist model.

The above analysis is concerned less with individual representatives of the regional elite, but rather the system of which they have become a part, which encourages diligence, not initiative, and does not assume autonomous responsibility and decision making. In many regions, a good portion of top managers consist of newcomers who have not had any connection to the region and will not have any in the future. Their psychology is that of temporary managers who are interested in getting as much from the region as possible without investing in its development. Further, not only has the elite been diminished in many regions, but the cultural layer from which able successors could be recruited has been exhausted.

Degradation of Human Potential and Social Capital

The degradation of human potential due to prolonged underinvestment in the social sphere, especially in education, on one hand, and outmigration of the most active part of the youth from the country, on the other hand, has contributed to Russia’s gradual downward slide. A landslide can be expected soon.

Such demographic dynamics can be described as negative, both in terms of birth rates/death rates and migration. Mass outmigration has perhaps exceeded the point of no return, at least in case of some regions. This trend results not only in a declining labor force, which makes impossible any further economic growth, but also deprives the most active and enterprising parts of society of potential modernization agents. This may lead to the de facto death of the Russian countryside, and thwart any hopes for modernization in the ethnic republics of the Caucasus.

Social capital, which had been growing in the early 2000s at a time of economic growth and development of civil society, is now being demolished by special efforts of the government. In demobilizing society, the regime has been effective in destroying credible personalities and not allowing new ones to emerge. The inner-elite trust has been ruined as well. In the short run, this decreases the risk of challenge to the government from within or from the outside. But in the longer run, it increases various risks in the event of social and economic crises. The regime fears the mobilization of society, and not without reason, but it is nearly impossible to find a way out of the current economic crisis without it.

An Abundance of State Weakness

The country’s rent-redistributive economic model has led to serious disparities in the state system, owing to the entire design of its giant and ineffective state machinery. Such disparities increase with the lowering of hydrocarbon profits, which are inevitable, due both to lower prices and decreases in sales and extraction. Shrinking production in the economic sector prevents the maintenance of this huge superstructure, which has grown during fat years, along with an exaggerated power and law enforcement bloc (which is beginning to look like a mammoth on a melting ice floe.) Throughout Putin’s rule, the system has been growing freely, and it has neither the sophistication nor built-in mechanisms to provide proportional means of reduction—everything must be done manually.

Also important is the fact that since 2005, the state machine has lived like a pig at the trough, only needing to open its mouth to be fed. In the meantime, dysfunctions have been growing in number and scale. This is particularly noticeable at a time when fewer resources are available to compensate for managerial inefficiency. In other words, when the excess food supply has shrunk, and foraging is necessary, it has become clear that coordination of different parts of the system needed to make the system function effectively is absent. In addition, regional interests are not being taken into account, not only when decisions are made, but also when it comes to implementation. This led, some time ago, to mass social protests in Vladivostok and Kaliningrad (2009–2010), which will appear again in growing numbers whenever the system begins to move without direction. Returning to the scenario of disintegration, one can say that almost certainly decline will come from the center through ill-considered and imbalanced actions taken by the regime.

Decision-Making

As an organizational model, Putin’s elite now resembles a “Tsar’s Court” rather than a “Board of Trustees.” In support of Putin’s new autocratic legitimacy, the elites depend on him more than he does on them. He is surrounded not so much by partners and comrades-in-arms, but by loyal servants. No important decisions can be made without him. The old mechanism of separate elite clans agreeing on important decisions, which might require several iterations and take a long time, no longer works in practice. That method involved a lengthy process with decisions first announced, then disavowed, revised and postponed. Now, it appears that elite clans increasingly act on their own without preliminarily agreeing with others. Then, of course, Putin has veto rights and can override decisions, but the cost of this is extremely high.

Under these circumstances, the risks of making and implementing poor decisions that go against the interests of the system—or of not making decisions on time—are growing.

Factors for Change

The current crisis poses serious risks to the system, owing both to a shrinking financial-economic base on which the regime rests; as well as to recent changes in the political-economic model. In addition, the aging/degradation of technical, socio-economic and managerial infrastructure creates risks, along the lines of the three different wavelengths of decline described earlier.

On one side, an archaic and extremely primitive/simplistic political-managerial model is less and less capable of facing complicated external challenges, and thus needs to be modernized. On the other side, there are no more resources to sustain it, which makes a change in the model inevitable. However, the short time horizon and fear of repeating Gorbachev’s perestroika failure prevents the authorities from attempting to change anything.

Legitimacy is another important factor pushing the authorities to change. Incapable of maintaining the current, extraordinary level of legitimacy reaped from Putin’s “military victories,” the authorities cannot, at the same time, easily switch back to electoral legitimacy. Electoral legitimacy is weaker, and if Putin were to obtain a “normal” 60 percent in the polls today, it would make him a much weaker leader, a chieftain who lost. To combine electoral, bottom-up legitimacy with that of a top-down chieftain, Putin would need 90-plus percent of votes and 90-plus percent of turnout, like in Central Asia. This looks impossible in Russia, where the political machinery has been dismantled. The only escape for Putin from this “ultra legitimacy trap” is either to not participate personally in elections by backing someone else, or by transforming elections into a plebiscite.

Major Risks

With the Kremlin weakening and losing its monopoly on power, public politics may reappear and strengthen. Negative socio-economic dynamics and a huge gap between public expectations (e.g. over Crimea or Syria) and reality may lead to frustration. A growing threat may then emerge as some play the nationalist card in elections, which could be extremely risky in the potential absence of Putin and nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky (who is widely perceived as having ties to the Kremlin).

The regime could perhaps defer such risks if the easing of Western sanctions make it possible to borrow money from external markets, enabling it to survive without undertaking changes.

In 2016, a realization of the depth and duration of the crisis argues for a more proactive approach, rather than just waiting for a rise in commodity prices. However, memories of the birth trauma of Gorbachev’s perestroika, when attempts made to improve the system led to its total collapse, overshadow any new strategy, as does the tactical calculation to maintain the status quo until the Duma elections. This situation heightens by the day the risk of collapse into an inefficient and decrepit system run by the autocratic party of the elderly Zhirinovsky; the Communist party, led by unknown leaders; or the bureaucratic United Russia.

The main change in the regime’s political-economic base, which has already begun, can be described as an oscillation of a gigantic pendulum, which was moving for too long toward the center, both in relations with the regions and with corporations. It should now move in the opposite direction, and the center can exercise two alternative strategies in this regard. It can either adjust to new realities and try to minimize losses, or try to keep the pendulum in its present position by not letting it move by any means. The Kremlin has chosen the latter—but trying to avoid losses today only increases their risks and scale tomorrow. If the oscillation of the pendulum away from the center is inevitable, in accordance with all economic forecasts, any attempts to prevent it are doomed and will lead to more radical changes as the pendulum gravitates in the direction of new realities.

Change of Leader and Replacement of Elites

One particular and growing risk is the regime’s over-reliance on the persona of its leader, given the limits of age and senescence. Moreover, the regime’s inability to reproduce cadres has become more and more evident as it attempts to renew some of its key elite representatives, replacing Putin’s closest associates, such as Vladimir Kozhin, Vladimir Yakunin and Victor Ivanov, with younger managers, who lack political weight—including the children of Putin’s elite, Il’ya Shestakov and Pavel Fradkov. One can say that the current elite is, therefore, disposable and that the departure of its leader will lead to a radical transformation.

Time Limits

The life expectancies of the political regime and of the country are not the same. A transformation of the regime could probably take place within a year. Putin’s departure and a change of the top elite will likely take place within the next five years. No other means exist for the regime to survive, and the alternative to radical transformation is collapse. In the latter case, it is difficult to make any forecasts because the regime will leave behind a political desert without any resources, without working institutions, with no credible politicians, and with a degraded population.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/si...4lBfNSLSt8
РАШИЗМ - НІПРАЙДЬОТЬ! Wink
Відповісти
#8
Надто довго знаходилися у тіні.

Але що ви пропонуєте - забороняти?
Наприклад, заборонити Шустера.
Порошенкові сподобається, мені здається, і мотивчик патріотичний.

(15-07-2016, 19:32 )Анатoль писав(ла): RE: Не варто мріяти про розвал Росії.

Так, іміграція з Росії сприятиме русифікації України.
Всі ці шустери, кисельови, ганапольські і зараз русифікують інформ.простір України.
Це взагалі неподобство, що іноземцям дозволяють працювати в українському телеефірі ведучими без знаня української, вести передачі іноземною мовою.
(Хоча це не лише іноземців стосується).
Відповісти
#9
є такий державницький інструмент, як оподаткування.

Алe прикоритнє жлобьйо не може не стягнути бабло з україномовних медія. Вдавиться блять.

(16-07-2016, 00:47 )Bayan писав(ла): Надто довго знаходилися у тіні.

Але що ви пропонуєте - забороняти?
Наприклад, заборонити Шустера.
Порошенкові сподобається, мені здається, і мотивчик патріотичний.

(15-07-2016, 19:32 )Анатoль писав(ла): RE: Не варто мріяти про розвал Росії.

Так, іміграція з Росії сприятиме русифікації України.
Всі ці шустери, кисельови, ганапольські і зараз русифікують інформ.простір України.
Це взагалі неподобство, що іноземцям дозволяють працювати в українському телеефірі ведучими без знаня української, вести передачі іноземною мовою.
(Хоча це не лише іноземців стосується).
#цинічнийбандера #цинічнібандери #cynicalbanderites http://coub.com/view/5lw0m
Відповісти
#10
(16-07-2016, 00:47 )Bayan писав(ла): Але що ви пропонуєте - забороняти?
Наприклад, заборонити Шустера.
Порошенкові сподобається, мені здається, і мотивчик патріотичний.

Всі ЗМІ в Україні повинні працювати українською мовою.
Для ведучих це повинно бути обовязковим.
Якщо хтось з гостей говорить на іноземній мові (російській, китайській, турецькій..) то повинен бути обовязковий переклад на українську.
(Ну не зобовязані громадяни України знати іноземні мови).

І це повинно бути однаково для всіх каналів і всіх ведучих.
При порушенні власник каналу звільняє ведучого.
При систематичному порушенні у власника забирається ліцензія на ефір.
Відповісти
#11
(15-07-2016, 18:49 )Анатoль писав(ла): По-перше цього не буде.

Може бути все що завгодно. Тому - може бути.

Цитата:По-друге нічого хорошого для України такий варіант не несе.

Це залежить від готовності країни до такого розвитку подій. Особисто я вважаю, що знищення Россії є благом для України.

Цитата:Треба виходити з того, що Росія завжди буде нашим сусідом.

Може бути все що завгодно. Тому - може й не завжди.

Цитата:А чи завжди буде ворогом?

Я переконаний, що завжди.

Цитата:А активна підривна робота проти України буде поки ми не станемо українцями, поки в Кремлі буде надія затягнути нас в русскій мір.

Ні. Підривну роботу вони все одно не припинять.

Цитата:Тож нам не на Росію треба дивитись, а творити українську націю і будувати українську державу.

Це потрібно робити в будь-якому разі.
Відповісти
#12
Аndrei Piontkovsky -- Life After Decline

Publication: Russia In Decline Volume: 1 Issue: 1July 6, 2016 05:18 PM Age: 9 days
By: Аndrei Piontkovsky

On August 1, 1991, following a cordial meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, US President George H. W. Bush arrived in Kyiv to deliver what later became known as the Chicken Kiev Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Bush warned Ukrainian legislators (most of them Communists) of the perils of suicidal nationalism and preached the benefits Ukraine would reap in a revamped Soviet Union, led by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Mikhail Gorbachev. Ukrainian comrades were reluctant to heed the presidential appeal; and by the end of August, the same Supreme Soviet declared the independence of Ukraine, which was later confirmed by a massive “yes” vote in a national referendum throughout all the regions of Ukraine, including Crimea.

The potential collapse of the USSR was a major concern for the US Administration, mostly due to the uncertain future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. When just several months after the Chicken Kiev Speech this collapse became a reality—to the US State Department’s utmost surprise—the US expended enormous effort securing the transfer of all of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation as the legal successor state to the USSR. The crowning achievement of these efforts was the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, under which the Russian Federation, the United States, and Great Britain provided security assurances for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which in exchange gave up its nuclear weapons. The true value of this memorandum was revealed in February 2014.

A quarter-century after these dramatic events, the world again faces the decline and potential collapse of another avatar of the Russian state. It took three plus centuries for the Romanov Empire to fail, and it took about seventy plus years to prove the totalitarian idea behind the USSR to be a failure as well. Why is it that such a young post-Communist incarnation of the Russian polity is turning into a failed state, as we speak? I believe that the key reason was the genesis of this model, its fatal birth defect. From 1989 to 1991, the Central European and Baltic nations experienced both democratic and national revolutions at the same time. The positive energy resulting from these developments produced successful state and national projects. In contrast, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, it has become painfully obvious that the USSR’s policy of perestroika had a clear agenda: The Communist Party and the KGB nomenklatura would seek to convert its collective and total political power into huge private fortunes for members of the nomenklatura.

They did so by tailoring the mafia state to their needs, which was deprived of any market-economy institutions, and, most important, of private property as its foundation. In Russia an “owner” succeeds by exploiting through proximity to, or direct association with, the authorities who control administrative resources (e.g. over a small or not very small segment of the state), and through complete loyalty to the ruling mafia and its honchos, rather than through efficient management and competition.

Criminal Putinomics is incapable of overcoming the addiction to oil money, and even with sky-high oil/gas prices, it would only stagnate for a long period. Any kind of successful development, business initiative, or innovation is totally unthinkable under Putin’s kleptocracy.

Until quite recently, the Putin regime was able to fulfill its simple duties under the social contract with its subjects. The Kremlin provided a passable (by Russian historical standards) standard of living for a large segment of the population: A once-a-year vacation in Turkey and a used car of foreign make. In exchange, the populace would allow the leadership to steal billions and ride the gravy train for ever and ever.

However, the war with Ukraine and worsening relations with the West triggered the inevitable collapse of Russia’s economic Potemkin Village and exposed a primitive obschak (the common loot fund of a criminal community in the Gulag). The gangland honchos thus failed to extend their 15-year-old contract with society.

Each additional day that the delusional dictator and his gang stay in office exacerbates the Russian crisis, makes an exit more challenging, and becomes hazardous even for the privileged few. This applies especially to regional elites and, particularly, to regional-ethnic elites, who have begun to ponder their future positions in a post-Putin Russia.

The regions have begun losing faith in the federal government’s ability to prevent economic crisis. At the same time, by taking resources away from the regions via taxation policy, while keeping regional leaders in charge of social policies, Moscow has left them alone to face the rapid slide of their populations into poverty.

In these circumstances, the territorial breakup of the Russian Federation is highly likely, as happened in 1917 and 1991. If Putin does not leave voluntarily (or with a little help from his friends) in 2016, by 2017 (the year of the centennial anniversary of the Russian Communist Revolution), Russia in its current incarnation will be gone. The most significant consequence of this tectonic split with respect to 21st-century world history will be the destiny of Siberia.

For the past 10–15 years, I have been preaching in vain to the Russian political class, trying to warn that

…confrontation with the West and the development of a “strategic partnership” with China will leave Russia not only marginalized but also subject to China's strategic interests. And this will lead in the end to the loss of control over the Russian Far East and Siberia, first de facto and then de jure. The Holy Aesopean Alliance of Emperors Pu and Hu is the alliance of a rabbit and a boa constrictor. Its outcome is inevitable, and it will be swift. We've been so desperate to hold together the tatters of our own “near abroad” that we failed to notice that we have now become part of China's “near abroad.” [1]

From 2009 to 2015, Russia entered into a number of bondage economic agreements with China, concerning, for example, energy supplies and joint development of mineral deposits. These ventures will be used in China to set up production of iron, copper, molybdenum, gold, antimony, titanium, vanadium, germanium, tin, etc. China will build processing facilities on Russian soil, where Chinese workers will be employed.

These agreements follow the pattern of relations that China has entered into with a number of African dictators in the past decade, though in the case of Africa, they provided for a significantly larger degree of employment for local people.

China has everything it needs: A license to digest a strategic region for a while—which so far remains outside its physical borders—plus regular energy supplies from the country China plans to digest. By the time this license expires, China would not need to renew it anymore. As Chinese military stratagem states: “An efficient control over a lengthy period of time will eventually shift geographic borders.”

China is so satisfied with the current development of Sino-Russian relations and so confident that from now on the game is going to be played by Chinese rules, that in May 2014, Chinese Vice-President Li Yuanchao, speaking at the round table “Russia-China: strategic economic partnership,” in the presence of the highest-ranking Russian officials, made a statement of unprecedented daring and frankness to the point of bordering on insult:

Our businessmen say that Russia has vast territories, while China has the most hardworking people in the world. If we can combine these factors, we’ll get a significant economic boost. Russia has a large territory and few people, while China is in exactly opposite situation. [2]

The last time a similar suggestion was made was in December 1949, by Mao Zedong, when he came to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. For some reason, Comrade Stalin disliked it so much so that Mao spent the next two months in Moscow under de facto house arrest. It seems that 65 years later, the Chinese leadership has decided that the northern barbarians are finally ready to accept it.

As Aleksandr Lukianov, a Siberian analyst, put it forth, one of the reasons for the key choices made by the Kremlin regarding Siberia

…could be motivated by the Russian leadership’s intention to secure additional assurances for its preservation of power. The Chinese are perfectly aware that in case of [a] change of government in Russia, any new leadership, which would replace the current one, be it liberal, communist, nationalist, red, green, or sky-blue pink, would immediately revise the conditions of “cooperation,” which is so beneficial for China, but rather harmful to Russia’s national interests. As a result China turns into a stakeholder directly involved in keeping the power in Russia in the hands of those people who generously acceded to yield resources of Siberia and [the] Russian Far East to China. [3]

China is quite happy with the current pace of consistent economic and demographic takeover of Siberia and the Russian Far East condoned by Russian rulers. As a Putinistan colony, Siberia is doomed to fall into China’s lap like a ripe (or, rather, rotten) fruit. Only a politically and economically independent Siberia would be able to preserve its Russian (and therefore European) identity.

If the Russian Federation begins to disintegrate, the Republic of Siberia would be one of the first to be proclaimed independent. The entire Beijing strategy, having been designed for decades, would be questioned, and in response Beijing would accelerate its takeover of Siberia and the Russian Far East. China could apply a number of political tactics in the face of total collapse of the Russian central government. It could, for example, employ a “Yanukovych scenario,” as follows:

One day, before Putin completely loses his official authority, Chinese commandos would evacuate him to Beijing, where he would be declared the legitimate President of Russia. In this capacity, he would sign any required letters and petitions to the Chinese government, and agreements with it. One of them, for instance, could be a “Request for the historical unification of the PRC [People’s Republic of China” and the RF [Russian Federation] in the family of nations—spiritual heirs of Genghis Khan’s Great Empire.”

I did not make up this language. It is taken from the writings of a former Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer and renowned sinologist, Colonel Andrei Devyatov. His pro-China lobbyist group “Heavenly Politics” promotes the idea of restoring the New Horde, which would oppose the soulless West.

China might also use the school of thought quite familiar from the annexation of Crimea: protection of fellow Chinese nationals in Siberia, and the polite little green men would be ready to provide them with humanitarian assistance.

Beijing’s practical goals would be to:

1. Return to the PRC territories marked in Chinese school history text books as annexed by Tsarist Russia under unfair treaties of 1858 and 1860.

2. Incorporate the rest of Siberia as Jochi Ulus (a.k.a. the Golden Horde) into a sort of union of states-heirs similar to Genghis Khan’s Great Empire. (The first leader of the reborn Jochi Ulus could be the above-mentioned, perfectly ideologically motivated “heavenly politician,” Colonel Devyatov.)

If implemented, this program would result in total de-Russification of the lands east of Urals in one to two generations.

For any Russian, apart from “heavenly politician” sinologists who went nuts about Westernphobia, the absorption of Russian Siberia into the Han sea, would be an irreversible tragedy. It would be also my personal tragedy, especially since all of my ancestors from my mother's line were Siberians, some of whom came to Moscow in November 1941 to take part and perish in a major battle of World War II.

But this would not be just a Russian issue. For humanity in general, the Chinese takeover of Siberia would be a quantum leap, which would change the geopolitical structure of the world forever. A new nation resembling Genghis Khan’s empire would emerge on the Eurasian continent. Central Asia would end up in its sphere of domination. Japan, Korea, and the rest of China’s neighbors (which have dozens of territorial disputes with China) would be extremely threatened by China’s boost.

And what about the world’s cop? Well, he is on vacation, at least till January 20, 2017. President Barack Obama would express serious concern. He would dispatch his Secretary of State to negotiate with Chinese President Xi and the Jochi Ulus Ruler Devyatov, immediately transferring all nuclear weapons deployed in Jochi Ulus to the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC. This step is required by the inviolable principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is also in the spirit of President Obama’s noble plan of moving toward global nuclear zero. The second US priority would be Jochi Ulus’s swift accession to the Paris Protocol Against Global Warming.

Secretary Kerry would enthusiastically embrace this historic mission, hoping that combined with his Iranian and Syrian diplomatic achievements, it would finally grant him his long-awaited Nobel Peace Prize. In the beginning, he might miss his traditional partner, Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov will have been summoned urgently to The Hague for a pressing issue. Soon enough, Secretary Kerry will have recomposed himself by finding a new Alpha male: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Actually, I doubt that events would develop so rapidly, and most likely not under the current Administration, but a new Administration in Washington will face the challenge of a century.

If China succeeds with a Siberian Anschluss, the world will never be the same. From then on, it will play by China’s rules. Nobody wants it to happen, but who will be able to resist such a fate? Nobody but the people of the Republic of Siberia and one more person: the 45th President of the United States.

The US is the only global power with the political, economic, and military resources to convince China to refrain from this breathtaking temptation. Most likely there will be no need to seek recourse in the last argument: military force. For China, it is very important to preserve its economic symbiosis with the US, much more so than for the latter. However, one should not rule out the risk of military escalation. Never before have the stakes been so high, both for the world and for the US, and the decision to be made falls to the US President.

Eight centuries ago, in 1206 and 1215 (by historical standards almost at the same time), in two places very distant from each other on earth, two political bibles were composed: the Great Yassa of Genghis Khan and the Magna Carta. The choice between an independent, ethnically European Russian Republic of Siberia and a reborn Mongol Empire may again be the choice for the entire world order in the 21st century: the Magna Carta or the Great Yassa. This choice will to a great extent depend on decisions made in Washington, DC.

Meanwhile, the rest of the world has nothing else to do but study carefully the faces of the candidates for the 45th President of the United States.

Notes

1. Andrei Piontkovsky, “At the Edge of the Middle Kingdom,” The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/artic...10628.html.

2. Andrei Piontkovsky, “A wise elder sister,” ARD, http://asiarussia.ru/blogs/3039/.

3. Alexander Lukyanov, “Degradation: Why or how was half of Russia given to China?” Za-nauku.ru, http://www.za-nauku.ru/index.php?option=...&Itemid=34.

* * *

Andrei Piontkovsky is a Russian scientist, political writer and analyst. He is a member of PEN International and a regular political commentator for the BBC World Service and Radio Liberty, on which has been an outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin. Dr. Piontkovsky is also the author of several books on the Putin presidency, including Another Look Into Putin’s Soul and Russian Identity. He holds a doctorate in mathematics from Moscow State University and is a member of the American Mathematical Society.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/si...4qZbtSLSt8
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#13
(14-07-2016, 23:02 )strq писав(ла): Скоро лісу вже не залишиться, блядь, а дурним матолкам рашка в голові. Неадеквати йобнуті.

Правильно. Дурні щось там ще про рашку думають. Негайно брататися з рашківцями, і разом іти на Київ бити блядських вальцманів. А потім на йобаний Париж, ну, коротше, Ніццу.
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